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EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM 
AND THE BISCOPIC TREATMENT OF RADICAL SCEPTICISM 
 
 
 
DUNCAN PRITCHARD 
University of Edinburgh 
 
 
ABSTRACT. How should epistemological disjunctivism respond to the problem of radical 
scepticism? The natural way to proceed seems to be some form of neo-Moorean view, 
whereby one deals with the sceptical puzzle by arguing that not only can one know that one is 
not the victim of radical sceptical hypotheses, but moreover one can know this on the basis of 
reflectively accessible factive reasons that entail the falsity of such hypotheses. While I argue 
that such an heroic anti-sceptical line is at least defensible, I maintain that there is a much 
better way to go. This involves recognising the dual nature of the sceptical problem and 
accordingly offering a two-pronged treatment, one that allies epistemological disjunctivism to 
a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology. This is what I call the biscopic response to radical 
scepticism. 
 
 
1. EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM 
 
Epistemological disjunctivism⎯at least as I defend the view anyway⎯holds that in paradigm cases of 
perceptual knowledge one knows in virtue of possessing rational support which is both factive 
(i.e., it entails the target proposition) and reflectively accessible. In particular, it holds that one can 
have perceptual knowledge that p in virtue of seeing that p, where seeing that p is factive, and where 
it is reflectively accessible to one that one sees that p.1  
My interest in this paper is to determine how best to embed epistemological disjunctivism 
within an anti-sceptical proposal. Accordingly, in what follows I will take it as given that 
epistemological disjunctivism is a defensible position, and that it has been shown to be rooted in 
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our everyday epistemic practices, and focus instead on its anti-sceptical import. As we will see, 
while one can extract a particularly robust response to this problem exclusively from the 
philosophical resources provided by epistemological disjunctivism, I think a more nuanced 
approach is required, one that draws on insights from Wittgenstein. Nonetheless, let me first offer 
a brief overview of the view and its distinctive features.  
Epistemological disjunctivism is rooted in the pioneering work of John McDowell (e.g., 
1995), but our focus here will be on the specific rendering of the thesis just offered. The view is 
highly controversial, to the extent that I think it is fair to say that until recently it was not seriously 
considered at all by epistemologists, on the grounds that it was obviously false. The main reason 
for this was that epistemologists have generally tended to accept the so-called new evil genius intuition 
regarding the nature of one’s reflectively accessible rational support. According to this intuition, 
since one cannot discriminate between normal (non-sceptical) conditions and parallel sceptical 
scenarios where one is radically deceived (e.g., as when one is a brain-in-a-vat, or ‘BIV’ for short), 
so it follows that the rational support reflectively available to one in the former scenario (the 
‘good’ case) can be no better than the rational support reflectively available to one in the latter 
scenario (the ‘bad’ case).2 If that’s right, then since one clearly does not have reflectively accessible 
factive perceptual reasons in the bad case (for one thing, the relevant propositions are false), it 
follows that one cannot have reflectively accessible factive reasons in the good case either, and 
hence epistemological disjunctivism must be false.  
Far from this line of reasoning demonstrating that epistemological disjunctivism is 
untenable, however, what it in fact exposes is that epistemological disjunctivism is committed to 
denying the new evil genius intuition. And, indeed, this is explicitly what it does.3 The basic line of 
thought is that we should not evaluate the scope of a subject’s reflectively accessible rational 
support in the good case by limiting it to that reflectively accessible rational support which is 
available in the bad case, even though the good and bad cases are by hypothesis indistinguishable. 
Hence, the new evil genius intuition has to go.  
Merely denying the new evil genius intuition will not suffice to make epistemological 
disjunctivism palatable, however. Instead, one must go further to show how the view is credible. 
To that end, in previous work⎯especially Pritchard (2012)⎯I have tried to argue for the 
following three claims. First, that epistemological disjunctivism is rooted in our ordinary epistemic 
practices, such that it is only in response to philosophical theorising about those practices⎯e.g., 
the sort of theorising that leads to the new evil genius intuition⎯that we are led to reject it. 
Second, that the philosophical problems that the view appears to face are entirely illusory, such 
that epistemological disjunctivism is at least an available position. Finally, third, that 
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epistemological disjunctivism is a highly desirable philosophical position (indeed, I went so far in 
this regard as to describe it as the ‘holy grail’ of epistemology). Moreover, since epistemological 
disjunctivism was already regarded as a controversial thesis, I set myself the task of arguing for 
these three theses without appealing to any additional philosophical claims that were controversial.  
It is easy to see why epistemological disjunctivism, if true (and especially if in addition 
rooted in our everyday epistemic practices), would be thought to be a desirable philosophical 
thesis. This is because it offers something that was previously thought to be simply unavailable. 
On standard ways of thinking about the epistemological internalism/externalism distinction, one is 
faced with a stark choice. On the one hand, one can appeal to the kind of reflectively accessible 
rational support that satisfies the epistemic internalist rubric, but then one has to concede that this 
is rational support that would be possessed even if one’s beliefs were radically in error (as they 
would be, if one were in the bad case). In short, one gives up on one’s epistemic support gaining 
one any direct epistemic grip on a world that is external to one.4 On the other hand, one can 
instead appeal to the kinds of epistemic standings favoured by epistemic externalists, such as 
reliability and so forth. Here one is assured of this epistemic support offering one a direct 
epistemic grip on a world that is external to one, since it is epistemic support that one only 
possesses if one stands in certain objective relations to that world. But now the price that one pays 
is that this epistemic support is, from a rational point of view, completely opaque to one. That 
one’s beliefs are forming in reliable ways, for example, is not something that is reflectively 
accessible to one.  
Epistemological disjunctivism seems to offer a very direct way of cutting the Gordian knot 
in this regard, for it presents a way of thinking about the epistemic support that one has in 
paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge such that it is both reflectively accessible and factive. This 
means that, like the epistemic support favoured by epistemic internalists, it is not rationally 
opaque, but also that this is epistemic support which, like that favoured by epistemic externalists, 
also offers us a direct epistemic grip on the external world (since it entails facts about that world).  
A further reason why epistemological disjunctivism might be thought to be a particularly 
desirable position is that it seems to offer us distinctive resources to deal with the problem of 
radical scepticism. For if we can have reflectively accessible factive perceptual reasons, then 
doesn’t that mean that we possess an excellent rational basis for dismissing this problem? 
Moreover, if epistemological disjunctivism is indeed rooted in our everyday epistemic practices, 
then it seems that we are in a position to offer a compelling diagnosis of what generates the 
sceptical problem. In particular, rather than this puzzle arising out of a fundamental tension in our 
most basic epistemological commitments, which is how the difficulty is usually cast, it is instead 
 4 
the result of a failure to take our everyday epistemic practices seriously, a failure that arises out of 
faulty philosophical reasoning.  
 
 
2. DISJUNCTIVE NEO-MOOREANISM 
 
Here is a fairly standard formulation of the problem of radical scepticism in the contemporary 
epistemological literature. ‘E’ refers to an instance of the kind of everyday propositions which we 
believe and which we take ourselves to have knowledge of, if we know anything much. It is also a 
proposition that is inconsistent with standard radical sceptical hypotheses, such as the BIV 
hypothesis. With these points in mind, we thus get the following formulation of radical scepticism: 
 
The Closure-Based Radical Sceptical Paradox 
(S11) One cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV. 
(S12) If one cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV, then one cannot 
have rationally grounded knowledge that E. 
(S13) One has rationally grounded knowledge that E.5  
 
The first claim is meant to be highly intuitive. Given that, ex hypothesi, one cannot distinguish 
between ordinary non-sceptical experiences and those experiences had by a BIV, how could one 
possibly have rationally grounded knowledge that one is not the victim of this sceptical scenario? 
In particular, to what would one appeal in order to motivate this claim?6 The third claim is also 
meant to be highly intuitive. Indeed, it essentially constitutes the denial of radical scepticism qua 
position (i.e., the view that we don’t have much of the knowledge that we take ourselves to have).  
 The force of this argument thus rests on the second claim. This isn’t held to be intuitive in 
itself, but is rather a bridging claim designed to bring (S11) and (S13) into conflict. Nonetheless, 
although this claim isn’t intuitive in its own right, it does seem to be entailed by a principle that is 
highly intuitive. Consider the following closure principle for rationally grounded knowledge: 
 
The Closure Principle  
If S has rationally grounded knowledge that p, and S competently deduces from p that q, thereby 
forming a belief that q on this basis while retaining her rationally grounded knowledge that p, then 
S has rationally grounded knowledge that q. 
 
With the closure principle in play, it follows that if one did have rationally grounded knowledge 
that E, then one could competently deduce from this knowledge that one is not a BIV, and 
thereby acquire rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV.7 Conversely, if it is already 
granted that one simply cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV, it 
follows that one cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that E either. We thus get (S12). 
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The guiding thought behind the closure principle is that competent deduction is a 
paradigm instance of a rational process. Accordingly, any belief that is grounded on a competent 
deduction from rationally grounded knowledge⎯and where the original rationally grounded 
knowledge is preserved throughout the deduction⎯cannot be itself any less rationally grounded. 
There are, of course, weaker formulations of closure-style principles in this general vein in the 
literature, and some of them have been rejected for various reasons.8 But it is hard to see how one 
could motivate a rejection of the principle as just formulated, which is why the debate about 
closure-based radical scepticism is now generally targeted on this specific formulation (or, at least, 
a formulation in the general vicinity of this one). How could one have rationally grounded 
knowledge, competently deduce a belief on this basis (while retaining the original rationally 
grounded knowledge), and yet lack rationally grounded knowledge of the proposition deduced? At 
the very least, any anti-sceptical strategy that proceeds by rejecting this principle will face a steep 
up-hill task.   
With the foregoing in mind, we can perhaps more perspicaciously formulate the radical 
sceptical paradox in terms of the following inconsistent triad: 
 
The Closure-Based Radical Sceptical Paradox* 
(S11*) One cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that one is not the victim of a radical 
sceptical hypothesis. 
(S12*) The Closure Principle. 
(S13*) One has lots of rationally grounded E-type knowledge.  
 
Since the three claims that make up this paradox are in logical conflict with one another, we know 
that at least one of them must be false. But since they are all highly intuitive, it is hard to see which 
is to go.  
 How should epistemological disjunctivism respond to this puzzle? It seems like the natural 
way to go is to reject the opening claim, (S11*). This line of response to the sceptical paradox is 
often known in the literature as ‘neo-Moorean’, on account of the fact that it mirrors G. E. 
Moore’s (e.g., 1925; 1939) commonsense approach to radical scepticism in certain respects.9 
Usually, however, neo-Moorean responses to radical scepticism proceed by arguing against (S11*) 
on epistemic externalist grounds.10 What would be distinctive about an epistemological 
disjunctivism neo-Moorean view (henceforth, disjunctive neo-Mooreanism), however, is that it would 
offer an epistemic internalist way of advancing neo-Mooreanism (albeit a non-classical version of this 
thesis), since the treatment of radical scepticism would be grounded in the notion of a reflectively 
accessible factive reason.  
 How might disjunctive neo-Mooreanism proceed? Well, presumably, the idea would be 
that one is able to competently deduce from one’s factively rationally grounded perceptual 
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knowledge, via a closure-based inference, that one is not the victim of a radical sceptical scenario. 
In this way, one can acquire rationally grounded knowledge⎯indeed, factively rationally grounded 
knowledge⎯of such claims as that one is not a BIV. Moreover, epistemological disjunctivism is 
able to tell a diagnostic story about why we were taken in by the sceptical problem. Our mistake 
was to buy into the faulty theoretical picture that has the new evil genius at its heart. Instead, what 
we should do is endorse the alternative picture offered by epistemological disjunctivism, and 
which is rooted in our everyday epistemic practices. According to this alternative account, we have 
a very straightforward way of dealing with the problem of radical scepticism. In this way, 
epistemological disjunctivism would be offering what is known as an undercutting response to the 
putative radical sceptical paradox, in that it would be claiming that what looks like a genuine 
paradox is in fact nothing of the sort, and instead rests on faulty theoretical claims that we can 
abandon with impunity.11  
 Is such a response to scepticism plausible? I’ve argued elsewhere that one can do a fair 
amount of work to make it plausible. In particular, I’ve argued that the kinds of distinctions that 
one needs to draw in order to explain why epistemological disjunctivism is in general a viable 
position also strengthen the anti-sceptical credentials of the position. For example, one problem 
that faces epistemological disjunctivism⎯which I’ve christened the distinguishability problem⎯is how 
it can explain how on this view it is possible (in the good case) to know that one is in the good 
case. Epistemological disjunctivism is committed to this possibility, since there is something 
reflectively available to one in the good case that is not reflectively available in the bad case⎯i.e., 
factive reasons. But it is hard to see how this claim can be squared with the fact that good and bad 
cases are by hypothesis indistinguishable.  
I argue that epistemological disjunctivism can evade this problem by appealing to a 
distinction that I claim all epistemologists should endorse, between favouring and discriminating 
epistemic support. The crux of the matter is that there can be a way of knowing that one is in one 
scenario rather than another, via one’s possession of favouring epistemic support, which does not 
thereby entail that one is able to perceptually discriminate between the two scenarios at issue. With 
this distinction in place, epistemological disjunctivism can maintain that there can be a way of 
knowing that one is in the good case rather than the bad case, by appeal to the favouring epistemic 
support provided by the possession of the factive reason, whilst nonetheless granting that one 
lacks a discriminative power to tell these two scenarios apart.12  
Applied to the sceptical problem, this manoeuvre enables epistemological disjunctivism to 
consistently maintain that while on this view one is in a position, in the good case, to come to 
acquire rationally grounded knowledge that one is not the victim of a sceptical hypothesis, this 
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knowledge is entirely compatible with the concession that one cannot discriminate between 
ordinary scenarios and their sceptical counterparts. This means that while epistemological 
disjunctivism is admittedly offering a rather blunt response to the problem of radical scepticism, 
the proposal is not quite as blunt as it might first appear. Moreover, as I’ve argued elsewhere, there 
are other philosophical resources that epistemological disjunctivism can draw on to further 
motivate their anti-sceptical position.13 The upshot is that disjunctive neo-Mooreanism is at least 
defensible as an anti-sceptical strategy.  
Even though this anti-sceptical strategy is defensible, I do not think that it is optimal. In 
order to see why, however, we will need to do something that I precluded myself from doing 
when I first defended epistemological disjunctivism, and that is to appeal to independent 
philosophical theses which are also controversial (though no less true as a result). 
 
 
3. THE TWO SOURCES OF SCEPTICISM 
 
The first thing we need to do is gain a more nuanced understanding of the nature of the radical 
sceptical problem. The formulation of this problem that we employed above, in keeping with 
standard practice, is closure-based. But there is also a second formulation of this problem available 
in the literature, which turns on what is known as the underdetermination principle: 
 
The Underdetermination-Based Radical Sceptical Paradox 
(S21) One cannot have a rational basis that favours one’s belief that E over the BIV scenario. 
(S22) If one cannot have a rational basis that favours one’s belief that E over the BIV scenario, 
then one lacks rationally grounded knowledge that E. 
(S23) One has rationally grounded knowledge that E.14 
 
As with the closure-based formulation of the radical sceptical paradox, these three claims are 
clearly in logical conflict, and hence we know that at least one of them must be false. The final 
claim that makes up the underdetermination-based radical sceptical paradox is identical to the final 
claim that makes up the closure-based radical sceptical paradox, so we can focus our attention on 
the other two.  
The first claim, (S21), captures the widely held commitment in epistemology to the so-
called new evil demon intuition that we noted above. Recall that this claimed that the rational basis 
for one’s beliefs in the good case can be no better than the rational basis for one’s counterpart’s 
beliefs in the sceptical bad case. It follows that (S21) must be true, since if one did possess a 
rational basis that favoured one’s everyday beliefs over sceptical alternatives, then that would run 
directly counter to the new evil demon intuition.  
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The second claim in the underdetermination-based formulation of radical scepticism, (S22), 
is meant to be derived from the following principle: 
 
The Underdetermination Principle 
If S knows that p and q describe incompatible scenarios, and yet S lacks a rational basis that 
favours belief that p over q, then S lacks rationally grounded knowledge that p. 
 
With this principle in play, it follows that if one lacks a rational basis which favours E over the 
BIV alternative, then one lacks rationally supported knowledge that E. We thus get (S22). 
 The underdetermination principle is meant to be entirely uncontentious. Consider what it 
would mean for it to be false. This would entail that one could have rationally grounded 
knowledge of a proposition even while recognising that the proposition believed was incompatible 
with an alternative scenario and that one’s rational basis for one’s belief didn’t favour it over the 
alternative scenario. An example might be having rationally grounded knowledge that one is seated 
even while recognising that one has no better reason for thinking that one is seated than that one 
is standing (a known to be incompatible alternative). Although there might be some dispute over 
what is involved in having rationally grounded knowledge, we would surely want a conception of 
this kind of knowledge such that it excluded this possibility.  
 These two formulations of the radical sceptical paradox are clearly very similar. They share a 
claim, and the sceptical challenge posed in each case is the same. Moreover, they can each be 
formulated in terms of a conflict between our rationally grounded knowledge of an everyday 
proposition, E, and an epistemic lack which is exposed by radical sceptical hypotheses, in this case 
the BIV hypothesis. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that they are widely held to be equivalent 
formulations of the sceptical problem.15 Crucially, however, these two formulations of the 
sceptical problem are in fact logically distinct, and this is because the epistemic demands made by 
the two epistemic principles on which they turn are subtly different.  
 We can evaluate the relative logical strengths of these two epistemic principles by 
considering, in a simplified and analogous fashion, what each principle demands in the particular 
case of a subject’s belief that E in the context of the BIV sceptical hypothesis: 
 
The Simplified Closure-Based Entailment 
If S has rationally grounded knowledge that E, then S has rationally grounded knowledge that she 
is not a BIV. 
 
The Simplified Underdetermination-Based Entailment 
If S has rationally grounded knowledge that E, then S has rational support for her belief that E 
which favours that belief over the sceptical alternative that she is a BIV. 
 
I take it that the simplified closure-based entailment is an obvious, and uncontentious, 
simplification of what the closure principle demands in this case. That the simplified 
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underdetermination-based entailment is a simplification of what the underdetermination principle 
demands is not so obvious, but that is because we are effectively working with a contraposed 
version of the principle. Uncontraposed, the entailment would be that if one lacks a rational basis 
which favours belief that E over the alternative sceptical scenario that one is a BIV, then one lacks 
rationally grounded knowledge that E. The reason why it is useful to work with a contraposed 
version of this claim is that the underdetermination-based entailment will then share its antecedent 
with the simplified closure-based entailment. We can thus focus our attention on what is entailed 
in each case.   
With the entailments generated by the underdetermination and closure principles 
simplified in this way, we can detect one obvious difference between them. This is that whereas 
the simplified closure-based entailment demands that one has rationally grounded knowledge that 
one is not a BIV, the simplified underdetermination-based entailment merely demands that one has 
a rational basis which favours belief that E over the BIV alternative. The former claim is much 
more demanding than the latter claim, in that one can have better reasons for believing E rather 
than the BIV hypothesis without thereby possessing rationally grounded knowledge that one is not 
a BIV. In particular, while having better reason to believe that E as opposed to the BIV hypothesis 
plausibly entails that one has some reason for believing that one is not a BIV, it would be a stretch 
to maintain that this by itself entails that one has rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a 
BIV (even granted that the entailed belief in question will be true). There is thus a strong prima facie 
basis for arguing that the underdetermination principle is logically weaker than the closure 
principle, in the sense that from the same antecedent the former principle extracts a logically 
weaker consequent. 
This point is confirmed once we reflect on the logical relationships in the other 
direction⎯viz., from the closure principle to the underdetermination principle. For notice that if 
one has rationally grounded knowledge that E, and one thereby has rationally grounded 
knowledge, via the closure principle, that one is not a BIV, then of course one inevitably has a 
rational basis which favours E over the alternative sceptical scenario that is a BIV. One has, after 
all, rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV. The closure principle is thus more 
demanding than the underdetermination principle.  
What this means for our dealings with the two formulations of the sceptical argument is 
not straightforward, since it depends on what anti-sceptical strategy one opts for. For example, if 
we were to approach underdetermination-based scepticism by denying the underdetermination 
principle, then that would obviously suggest a response to closure-based scepticism which 
involved denying the closure principle. But if one opts to retain the underdetermination principle, 
then there would be various options available for dealing with closure-based scepticism. In any 
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case, the crux of the matter is that we need to be sensitive to the subtle differences between these 
formulations of scepticism.  
In particular, notice that the difference between the two formulations of the sceptical 
problem reflect two distinct motivations for scepticism, even though the sceptical upshot is the 
same. Closure-based scepticism arises out of a commitment to what we might term the universality 
of rational evaluation, where this involves the thought that there are no in principle limitations on the 
scope of rational evaluation. This commitment is revealed in the fact that via closure-based 
inferences we can, it seems, harmlessly shift our focus from local rational evaluations to global 
rational evaluations, as when we query the rational basis of the denials of radical sceptical 
hypotheses. Underdetermination-based scepticism, in contrast, is concerned with what we might 
term the insularity of reasons, where this is the claim that the rational support that our beliefs enjoy, 
even in the best case, can be no better than the rational support enjoyed by our envatted 
counterparts. It is only with this commitment in play that the underdetermination principle can 
generate the advertised sceptical conclusion.16  
 I have argued elsewhere that we should reject both of these underlying claims.17 What is 
important for our present purposes, however, is that the way in which one motivates a denial of 
these claims is very different, as reflecting the fact that they are distinct sceptical sources leading to 
logically distinct formulations of the sceptical problem. It should be clear that epistemological 
disjunctivism is primarily engaging not with closure-based radical scepticism, but rather with 
underdetermination-based radical scepticism. In particular, in its defence of reflectively accessible 
factive rational support, and hence its rejection of the new evil demon intuition, epistemological 
disjunctivism is directly rejecting the insularity of reasons thesis. Epistemological disjunctivism 
thereby offers an undercutting response to underdetermination-based radical scepticism by arguing 
that the case for (S21) rests on a faulty philosophical picture, one that should be rejected in favour 
of the alternative picture offered by epistemological disjunctivism, and which is rooted in our 
everyday epistemic practices.  
 If one held that these two formulations of the sceptical problem were equivalent, and traded 
on a common sceptical source, then it would follow that one ought to expect a response to 
underdetermination-based scepticism to directly generate a response to closure-based radical 
scepticism also. But we have seen that these formulations of the sceptical problem are not 
equivalent, and hence there is a further step to be taken here. Moreover, we have also noticed that 
there is a logical distance between the claim that one can have the requisite favouring epistemic 
support sufficient to deny (S21) and the idea that⎯in keeping with disjunctive neo-
Mooreanism⎯one is able to know the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses. Is this logical space 
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that epistemological disjunctivism can exploit as part of its anti-sceptical strategy?    
 
 
4. THE BISCOPIC RESOLUTION OF SCEPTICISM 
 
I think so. In particular, I think that rather than trying to resolve both of these formulations of 
radical scepticism by appeal to only epistemological disjunctivism, one should instead feel free to 
bring in resources from elsewhere. After all, given that these are two logically distinct formulations 
of the sceptical problem, trading on distinct sceptical sources, why should we presume that they 
must be afforded a common solution? Instead, my favoured treatment of these two putative 
paradoxes is one that is biscopic, where by this I mean a form of anti-scepticism which takes the 
dual-nature of the problem seriously, and as a consequence responds with an integrated two-
pronged resolution. 
 We have just seen that epistemological disjunctivism is an effective antidote to 
underdetermination-based radical scepticism, in that it deprives this formulation of the sceptical 
problem of one of the key claims that motivate it (i.e., the insularity of reasons thesis, which 
underpins (S21)). But that one can possess rational support for one’s perceptual beliefs such that 
they decisively favour those beliefs over sceptical alternatives does not itself require us to hold that 
one can have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of sceptical hypotheses. That is, while 
one might endorse this further claim, and thereby advocate the disjunctive neo-Mooreanism 
outlined earlier, it is not obligatory.  
Moreover, there are reasons to avoid this further claim if one can. After all, we do have a 
strong intuition that we are unable to know the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses, and it is 
obviously beneficial to an undercutting anti-sceptical strategy to respect these intuitions if possible. 
Furthermore, while one could commit epistemological disjunctivism to claiming that we can know 
the denials of radical scepticism, it is now apparent that there is a genuine option available which 
involves avoiding this commitment. In particular, now that we have distinguished between these 
two formulations of radical scepticism, and noted their logical differences, it becomes clear that 
there is an additional theoretical move in play here, in that the possession of the relevant factive 
favouring support does not itself entail that one can know the denials of radical sceptical 
hypotheses. The crux of the matter is that epistemological disjunctivism is directly engaging with 
underdetermination-based radical scepticism, and is only indirectly aimed at the closure-based 
formulation. 
 Ultimately, of course, whether it is desirable to hold back from endorsing the full neo-
Moorean stance depends very much on the alternatives on offer. In the remainder of the paper I 
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want to outline, in broad terms, the alternative that I favour, and why I think it is more compelling 
than the neo-Moorean approach. This involves appeal to a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology 
that draws on Wittgenstein’s (1969) influential remarks on the structure of rational evaluations in 
his final notebooks, published as On Certainty. Although a hinge epistemology has often been 
thought to be a competitor to epistemological disjunctivism when it comes to dealing with the 
sceptical problem, I claim that once we understand that we are dealing with two logically distinct 
formulations of radical scepticism, trading on distinct sceptical sources, then it becomes apparent 
that they are not in conflict at all. Indeed, I maintain that these two proposals are in fact natural 
bedfellows, in that they are not only consistent with one another, but in fact complement each 
other.  
 One of the guiding themes of Wittgenstein’s remarks on the structure of rational 
evaluation is that all rational evaluations, whether positive (e.g., anti-sceptical) or negative (e.g., 
sceptical), by their nature take place relative to a backdrop of so-called “hinge” commitments. 
These hinge commitments which we all have are not acquired via rational processes, nor are they 
responsive to rational considerations. They are, as Wittgenstein (1969) puts it, ‘visceral’ and 
‘animal’ (e.g., §359), rather than being the result of ratiocination. Even so, we are optimally certain 
of them, and it is this backdrop of certainty that enables rational evaluations to take place. One 
consequence of this is that the hinge commitments cannot themselves be rationally evaluated, 
since they are instead what needs to stand fast in order for rational evaluations to take place. They 
are the hinges relative to which rational evaluation is possible.  
Consider this famous passage: 
 
[...] the questions that we raise and our doubts depend upon the fact that some propositions are 
exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn. 
  That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are 
in deed not doubted. 
  But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t investigate everything, and for that 
reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must 
stay put. (Wittgenstein 1969, §§341-3)18 
 
Note that Wittgenstein is keen to emphasise here that it is not a mere incidental lack on our part 
that all rational evaluations take place relative to a backdrop of arational hinge commitments. 
Rather, he wants to hold that this is how rational evaluations have to be⎯it is a matter of logic, as 
he would put it. It follows that the very idea of a universal rational evaluation is simply incoherent, 
since there could be no such thing. Far from being innocuous, the universality of rational 
evaluation thesis is thus simply false.  
 Does this mean that a hinge epistemology is committed to denying the closure principle, 
and thereby endorsing a highly revisionary anti-sceptical strategy? It can certainly look that way, 
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given how closure seems to enable fully general rational evaluations by licensing us to draw anti-
sceptical conclusions from our everyday knowledge. I think this would be premature, however. 
The reason for this is that if we take Wittgenstein’s description of hinge commitments seriously, 
then there is a principled way of retaining the closure principle while nonetheless denying the 
universality of rational evaluation thesis.  
Recall that Wittgenstein held that our hinge commitments are in their nature neither 
acquired via, nor responsive to, rational considerations, but should instead be understood as 
animal, visceral etc. If that’s right, however, then whatever the propositional attitude involved in a 
hinge commitment, it is not the kind of propositional attitude that epistemologists are interested in 
when they are concerned with rationally grounded knowledge. That is, it is not a belief, at least in 
the sense of belief such that it is a constituent of rationally grounded knowledge.19 After all, belief 
in this sense is a belief that the target proposition is true, and that means that it is not the kind of 
propositional attitude that would be unaffected by, for example, discovering that one had no 
rational basis for regarding the target proposition as true. But Wittgenstein is claiming that our 
hinge commitments embody precisely the kind of commitment that would remain even if we 
became aware that there was no reason for thinking the target proposition to be true, thereby 
disqualifying them from being beliefs in this sense. Crucially, however, the radical sceptical use of 
the closure principle essentially involves the acquisition of a belief (i.e., that one is not the victim 
of a radical sceptical hypothesis) in just this sense via the paradigmatically rationally process of 
competent deduction. It follows that closure is simply inapplicable to our hinge commitments on 
at least two fronts, in that one cannot form beliefs in a hinge commitment in the relevant sense, 
much less form such a belief on the basis of a rational process.  
This point is important since it highlights the non-revisionary aspect of Wittgenstein’s 
proposal. The closure principle turns out to be unproblematic. What is problematic is rather the 
conjunction of this principle with the universality of rational evaluation thesis. Only with these two 
theses combined can one generate the closure-based sceptical paradox, since only then can one 
employ closure to draw inferences regarding radical sceptical hypotheses. Put another way, the 
putative inconsistent triad that we offered above with regard to closure-based scepticism is in fact 
not inconsistent at all, as one can endorse all three claims without contradiction so long as one 
rejects the universality of rational evaluation thesis. Where the closure-based radical sceptical 
paradox goes awry is with regard to the bridging claim that is meant to be derived from the closure 
principle (i.e., (S12)), since it turns out that closure alone is not sufficient to derive this claim, as 
one also needs the universality of rational evaluation thesis too. In particular, it is only if one is 
able to plug radical sceptical hypotheses into closure-style competent deductions, and thereby 
come to acquire beliefs in our hinge commitments as a result, that we can generate this bridging 
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claim, and this possibility is ruled-out once we reject the university of rational evaluation thesis. In 
this way, Wittgenstein is offering us an undercutting response to closure-based radical scepticism 
that demonstrates that this is in fact a pseudo-problem, in that it essentially turns on an appeal to a 
philosophical thesis that has been shown to be false.20  
In any case, the point of the foregoing has not been to convince the reader of the merits of 
the Wittgensteinian approach to closure-based scepticism, but rather just to explain what such a 
proposal amounts to. Note, however, that this approach to scepticism gains no purchase at all on 
underdetermination-based radical scepticism. For instance, that it is in the nature of rational 
evaluations that they are essentially local is entirely compatible with the idea that all rational 
support is by its nature insular. There is thus no straightforward route from the rejection of the 
universality of rational evaluation thesis to a rejection of the insularity of reasons thesis. Given the 
logical differences between these two formulations of the sceptical problem that we noted above, 
this is hardly surprising. But if we do not expect a Wittgensteinian rejection of the universality of 
rational evaluation thesis to offer us a solution to underdetermination-based scepticism, then why 
should we expect an anti-sceptical proposal that is targeted at underdetermination-based 
scepticism, such as epistemological disjunctivism, to be applicable to the closure-based 
formulation of the problem? 
Here is the crux: epistemological disjunctivism and the Wittgensteinian account of the 
structure of rational evaluation are natural philosophical bedfellows. If one weds the former to the 
latter, then one has a response to underdetermination-based radical scepticism (via a rejection of 
the insularity of reasons thesis) that is not committed to epistemic immodesty when it comes to 
closure-based radical scepticism. This is because although one can have factive rational support for 
one’s everyday beliefs, one cannot convert such factive support, via a closure-style inference, into 
factive rational support for one’s hinge commitment that one is not the victim of radical sceptical 
hypotheses. And, going in the other direction, if one weds the latter to the former, then one has a 
response to closure-based radical scepticism (via a rejection of the universality of reasons thesis) 
that can also handle underdetermination-based radical scepticism. On this view, while all rational 
evaluations are essentially local, it is nonetheless also the case that one’s everyday beliefs can be in 
the market for factive rational support, contra the insularity of reasons thesis.   
If I am right that the sceptical problem trades on two distinct sources of scepticism, 
reflected in the fact that it generates two logically distinct formulations, then it is hardly surprising 
that an adequate solution to this problem will require a double-faceted—i.e., biscopic—response. 
Indeed, we should expect that any attempt to derive an answer to both formulations of the 
sceptical problem from a single anti-sceptical thesis is bound to generate awkward philosophical 
consequences, just as we saw with disjunctive neo-Mooreanism. Rather that trying to extract a 
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treatment of both formulations of the sceptical problem from epistemological disjunctivism alone, 
we should instead target this view only on that aspect of the problem that it is directly equipped to 
deal with, and allow a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology to handle the other aspect of the 
sceptical problem. I thus submit that a biscopic response to the problem of radical scepticism 
along these lines is preferable to one that appeals only to epistemological disjunctivism.21 
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NOTES 
 
1  I’ve defended epistemological disjunctivism in a number of works. See, especially, Pritchard (2012). See also Neta & 
Pritchard (2007), and Pritchard (2007; 2008; 2011a; 2011b; 2015a). For two recent symposia on Pritchard (2012), see: 
Littlejohn (2015), Pritchard (2015b; 2015c), Schönbaumsfeld (2015), and Zalabardo (2015); and Goldberg (forthcoming), 
Littlejohn (forthcoming), Neta (forthcoming), and Pritchard (forthcomingb; forthcomingc).  
2  For the key statements of the new evil genius intution, see Lehrer & Cohen (1983) and Cohen (1984). For some 
useful recent discussions of this intution, and how it is best understood, see Littlejohn (2009) and Pritchard 
(forthcomingd). Note that both epistemic internalists and epistemic externalists tend to endorse this intution. The 
difference between the two is that the latter are inclined to think that there is a lot more to the epistemic standing of 
one’s beleifs than the scope of one’s reflectively accessible reasons, since other factors (which may well vary across 
good and bad cases), such as the reliability of the belief-forming process in play, can also be relevant.   
3  See Neta & Pritchard (2007) for more on this point. See also Pritchard (2012, part one).  
4  Note that I am here effectively equating epistemic internalism with accessibilism, and thereby setting to one side the 
alternative rendition of epistemic internalism offered by mentalism. I don’t think anything of importance rests on this 
for our purposes. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere—see Pritchard (2011b; 2012, part one)—that epistemological 
disjunctivism is compatible with both ways of thinknig about epistemic internalism. For the classic discussion of 
mentalism, see Conee & Feldman (2004).    
5  Note that this formulation of radical scepticism is in fact much stronger than we need to generate the sceptical 
paradox. In particular, in terms of (S11), it would suffice, for example, that one does not⎯as opposed to the stronger 
cannot⎯have rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV. Relatedly, it would suffice for (S12) that it follows 
from one’s lack of rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV that one lacks rationally grounded knowledge 
that E. Nonetheless, I have opted for the stronger rendering because this best captures the sceptical claim in play. 
After all, it is not as if the sceptic is pointing out an incidental lack on our parts, as if this is a lack that we could 
overcome if only we were more attentive, more imaginative, cleverer, and so on.   
6  Note that in order to keep matters simple I am setting to one side those responses to radical scepticism⎯e.g., Vogel 
(1990)⎯which claim that we have an abductive rational basis for preferring our everyday beliefs over sceptical 
alternatives. I critically discuss such a proposal in Pritchard (2015a, ch. 1). 
7  Note that here, and in what follows, we are taking it as given that one knows that E entails that one is not a BIV.  
8  In particular, the most famous rejections of closure-style principles as a means of blocking radical scepticism⎯due 
to Dretske (1970) and Nozick (1981)⎯have been concerned with much weaker formulations of the closure principle, 
and hence do not straightforwardly apply to the closure principle as we have formulated it here. For a useful recent 
exchange on the status of closure-style principles, see Dretske (2005a; 2005b) and Hawthorne (2005).  
9  Perhaps better put, it mirrors a caricatured version of Moore’s treatment of radical scepticism (as I’m sure anyone 
using the term would freely admit). For what I think is the first usage of the moniker, ‘neo-Moorean’, in this context, 
see Pritchard (2002a).    
10  See, for example, Sosa (1999) and Pritchard (2002b; 2005a).   
11  In contrast, an overriding response to the radical sceptical paradox grants that the paradox is genuine, but motivates a 
revisionary response that enables us to reject one of the core claims that drives the paradox. For further discussion of 
undercutting and overriding responses to putative philosophical paradoxes, see Pritchard (2014; 2015a, part one).  
12  I introduced the distinction between favouring and discriminating epistemic support in Pritchard (2010). For the 
application of this distinction in support of epistemological disjunctivism, see Pritchard (2012a, part two).  
13  I explore the anti-sceptical credentials of disjunctive neo-Mooreanism at length in Pritchard (2012, part three). See, 
in particular, the dialectical points that I make on behalf of this position, but which I have elided here for reasons of 
space. See also Pritchard (2008).  
14  As with our formulation of the closure-based radical sceptical paradox above⎯see endnote 5⎯note that this 
formulation of radical scepticism is in fact much stronger than we need to generate the sceptical paradox. In particular, 
in terms of (S21), it would suffice, for example, that one does not⎯as opposed to the stronger cannot⎯have a rational 
basis which favours one’s belief that E over the BIV scenario. Relatedly, it would suffice for (S22) that it follows from 
one’s lack of such a favouring rational basis that one lacks rationally grounded knowledge that E. 
15  Or, at least, if they are logically distinct, then they are logically distinct in ways that aren’t dialectically interesting. 
For further discussion of the structure of the sceptical argument, see Brueckner (1994), Cohen (1998), and Pritchard 
(2005a, ch. 4; 2005b; 2015a, part one).  
16  For further discussion and defence of the idea that closure-based radical scepticism and underdetermination-based 
radical scepticism are logically distinct, and that they reflect two distinct sources of scepticism, see Pritchard (2015a, 
part one). See also Pritchard (2005a, part one; 2005b).  
17  See especially Pritchard (2015a). See also Pritchard (forthcominga). 
18  Although the “hinge” metaphor is the dominant symbolism in the book, it is accompanied by various other 
metaphors, such as the following: that these propositions constitute the “scaffolding” of our thoughts (Wittgenstein 
1969, §211); that they form the “foundations of our language-games” (Wittgenstein 1969, §§401-3); and also that they 
 19 
 
represent the implicit “world-picture” from within which we inquire, the “inherited background against which [we] 
distinguish between true and false” (Wittgenstein 1969, §§94-5). 
19  There are, of course, many notions of belief operative in the philosophical literature. See, for example, Stevenson 
(2002) for a recent taxonomy of different kinds of belief. It is thus important to my claim that our hinge commitments 
are not beliefs that I have a particular notion of belief in mind (i.e., that propositional attitude which is meant to be a 
constituent of rationally grounded knowledge).   
20  For further defence of this particular rendering of Wittgenstein’s proposal regarding the structure of rational 
evaluation, see Pritchard (2015a, part two). For two recent surveys of the contemporary literature on hinge 
epistemology, see Pritchard (2011c; forthcominge).  
21  Thanks to Joseph Milburn, Veli Mitova, Ram Neta and an anonymous referee for Cambridge University Press. An 
earlier version of this paper was presented at the ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism’ conference at the University of 
Pittsburgh, April 2016.  
